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Introduction 
And people live in the Thing, 
And people die in the Thing, 
And people sleep on the Thing,  
And people go to sleep hungry. 
Because this is what the Thing brought 
It brought immense destruction 
Because destruction is a piece of the Thing 
A knife to the head of the beast 
 
In his satirical poem “The Thing,” Ahmad Fu’ad Negm paints a vivid picture of Egyptian life in 
the latter half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Excoriating Sadat’s Infitah 
policies, Negm describes the immense destruction brought on by Infitah, to the values of the nation, to 
the poor, and the ignorance and corruption with which Egypt moved into a new economic era. Negm, 
known as “al-fujami” or “The Outspoken One” for his nascent political expression and opposition 
under successive Egyptian regimes, taps into the experience of Egyptians with liberal development like 
no traditional academic can. He exudes playfulness in his work while describing a social, economic, 
and political phenomenon that sapped economic security and livelihoods from millions.   
What Negm expresses about Egypt boils down to an analysis of life under unequal economic 
development and reform and exposes a disconnect between the actions and rhetoric of the political and 
economic elite in contrast to the experiences of everyday Egyptians. The political frustration found in 
Negm’s economic critique sets the groundwork for viewing political developments in Egypt through 
the lens of the benefits and the burdens generated by Egypt’s transition from socialism to capitalism, 
from statism to market liberalism. This transition deeply challenged the expectations of the Egyptian 
people as the government receded from its role as economic guarantor and became an apparatus for 
furthering capitalist cronyism and political patronage. In shifting from one economic model to the other 
as a part of the “Neoliberal turn”, successive Egyptian regimes implemented policies that attempted to 
alleviate various economic crises. During this time, the Egyptian government took on obligations with 
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International Financial Institutions(IFIs) as well as foreign governments, necessitating changes in 
Egypt’s economic model from state driven to market driven, from public sector to private sector.  
This change in policy and economic, partially imposed and partially pushed internally, exposed 
contradictions in the Egyptian political economy. Following the revolution of the Free Officers, the 
Egyptian social contract guaranteed the Egyptian people economic and social security in return for tacit 
support for the government and its regime. Established under the ideology of Nasrist socialism, the 
state grew to ensure jobs, education, social security, health care, and a revamped Egyptian nationalist 
image centering Egypt’s glory and its resistance to the bi-polar order of the Cold War and Israel’s 
nascent presence. Part and parcel with this form of governance was a centralized regime of corruption 
and patronage politics which maintained the state. This corruption provided insurances for regime 
stability and was passed down from Nasr to Sadat to Mubarak. The onset of economic transition post-
Nasr broke this contract.  
The transition from Nasserist socialism to crony capitalism via liberal reform brought with it 
serious implications for the functioning of the state and the economy. The present analysis divides 
along the lines of the contrasting rural and urban experiences under neoliberal reform, focusing on the 
Mubarak era. Housing and land policy, agricultural policy and food security, employment, services, and 
patronage politics all changed and affected the countryside and the cities of Egypt in related but unique 
ways under economic reform. Putting the divergent experiences of the rich and the poor, the strong and 
the weak, in the context of the rural-urban divide informs the process of comprehending political and 
economic frustration in the lead-up to the Arab Spring in particular and political revolution by-in-large. 
Furthermore, this divide contributes to an understanding of why Egypt failed to live up to its billing as 
a success story of neoliberal economic policy as the forces of corruption, stagnation, and disconnect 
between the powerful interest of regime maintenance clashed with the desire for prosperity, financial 
security, and social justice. 
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This analysis explores the unique and tumultuous approach to reform in Egypt and addresses 
the effects of the implementation of neoliberal policy tools. These tools included privatization, price 
liberalization, deregulation, and land reform in both urban and rural areas. Based on these effects, this 
analysis will argue that the benefits accrued by the political-economic elite created opportunities for 
new patronage networks that upheld elite economic privilege through the process of liberalization 
while a wide swath of Egyptians suffered the loss of limited privileges and protections from the state 
established by Nasr and upheld by his successors. Consequently, the socialist-statist ‘social contract’ 
underlying the legitimacy of successive regimes crumbled as the withdrawal of state support for 
industry, agriculture, and services thrust more and more Egyptians into poverty and economic 
insecurity, and the failure of a healthy private sector to materialize exacerbated unemployment. The 
promise of modernization and economic prosperity via the path of neoliberal reform contrasted 
significantly with the reality of concentrated gains captured by few while urban workers, small farmers, 
and public sector employees lost their job security, land security, steady wages, and state supports. 
These developments which began during the time of Anwar Sadat and peaked under the rule of Hosni 
Mubarak, eroded public quiescence and tolerance of a corrupt and increasingly detached regime, 
undercut legitimacy and fomented revolution. The contrast between the regime’s narratives of 
legitimacy and the real-world effects of the reform policies of the Mubarak regime provide an 
understanding for how the economic frustrations of Egyptians materialized into revolution. The 
domestic conditions of impending succession (tawreeth) from Hosni to Gamal Mubarak combined with 
declining economic conditions fed off the Tunisian revolution to mobilize the related grievances of 
Egyptians to demand change. The context of decades of push-and-pull, stop-and-start reform with 
marginal benefits and tangible costs set the stage for these popular frustrations and grievances to 
coalesce along with a greater regional movement.   
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The consequences of the frustrations and subsequent movements that coalesced around 
neoliberal reform are not confined to the onset of the 2011 Arab Spring in Egypt. This analysis 
examines how changing economic expectations and reform policy interact with political structures and 
established sources of popular legitimacy. This relationship builds a framework for understanding how 
the success of economic development in a country relies upon established political expectations of the 
distribution of power and control. This framework provides the potential for explanatory power for a 
diverse set of examples across political arrangement and economic circumstance. Furthermore, the 
localized case of Egypt remains fluid and complex following the Arab Spring, as neoliberal economic 
reform remained a tenet of the Muslim Brotherhood’s policy during their time in power and continues 
to direct economic discourse with the current El-Sisi regime. These post-2011 developments do not 
receive comprehensive attention in this analysis and deserve greater attention, some of which has been 
addressed in literature addressing neoliberalism and Islamism,1 and neoliberalism as carried out by El-
Sisi.2 This work aims to provide a groundwork for the relevant policy changes and shift in the 
distribution of resources and benefits under Mubarak with an eye on the urban-rural divide as a means 
of zooming in on the ground level effects of liberal reform on different environments and tying those 
effects to political frustration.  
 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
1 See Joya, Angela. "Neoliberalism, the state and economic policy outcomes in the post-Arab uprisings: The case of 
Egypt." Mediterranean Politics 22, no. 3 (2017): 339-361. 
• 2 See Dalacoura, Katerina.“Islamism and neoliberalism in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings: The Freedom 
and Justice Party in Egypt and Nahda in Tunisia”. In Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State in the 
Middle East and North Africa, ed. Emel Akçali 61-83. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
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Literature focusing on Egyptian political economy and neoliberal economic reform rarely 
combines concrete and nuanced policy analysis with the political significance of that policy. This work 
aims to fill that gap with an approach which recognizes both. In Egypt, the political economy’s 
orientation towards regime survival determined the rate of reform, the policies and rhetoric of the 
reform program, and the actual implementation of reform. Consolidating the study of neoliberal reform 
policies and localized political economy under one umbrella helps answer questions neither group can 
fully address alone. Moreover, doing so conceptualizes a rationality of reform. On a base level, 
underlying political arrangements can explain why similar reform policies yielded differing levels of 
success in implementing economic reform in comparative scenarios. On a theoretical level, the 
interaction between the structure of a political arrangement and a given reform program reshapes the 
political landscape as economic and thus political expectations shift, disintegrate, or reform. The story 
of the Egyptian uprising, with similarities throughout the Arab world and beyond, follows the shifting 
political implications of reform.  
With the intent of combining the study of political economy with neoliberal economic reform, 
this study adopts the framework of neoliberal governmentality. Governmentality is separated from 
other conceptions of the state or authority by Foucault. Barry et. al write that Foucault distinguished 
governmentality in two ways, as a “practice” and “political rationality.”3 Governmentality as practice is 
distinguished from theory and ideology by its deliberate attempt to shape the world and spacialize the 
policies of governance.4As a political rationality, governmentality serves as a “machinery or apparatus 
for rendering reality thinkable” and deploys a system of reasoning in creating that reality.5 Neoliberal 
 
3 Barry, Andrew, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose. Foucault and Political Reason: liberalism, neo-liberalism and the 
rationalities of government. Routledge, 2013. 
4 Barry et. al, 41. 
5 Ibid., 42 
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governmentality thus employs a particular political rationality in order to put into practice the tenets of 
neoliberal political and economic ideologies.  
Ferguson and Gupta further expand the definition of neoliberal govermentality to include 
relationships beyond a given society or state. They write that relevant extensions “include not only new 
strategies of discipline and regulation, exemplified by the WTO and the structural adjustment programs 
implemented by the IMF, but also transnational alliances forged by activists and grassroots 
organizations and the proliferation of voluntary organizations supported by complex networks of 
international and transnational funding and personnel.”6 While I do not delve into the transnational 
context of Egyptian reform, the close connection between some Arab Spring countries in terms of 
uneven neoliberal development as well as the similarities and differences between countries which 
undergo structural adjustment merits greater study. Varman et. al7 also add a further definition 
conceptualizing neoliberal governmentality in the context of freedom. They claim that “according to 
the neoliberal discourse, people are free as long as they are working, are psychologically healthy, stay 
on the right side of the law, and so on. If people are unable to fulfill these fundamental neoliberal 
obligations, they become a threat, and the discourse holds that individual freedom can be rightfully 
restricted through sheltered employment, imprisonment, hospitalization, and similar institutions of 
confinement.”8 My analysis does not engage extensively with the coercive elements of neoliberal 
governmentality, but Varman et. al provide an important reminder that ostensibly benign economic 
policy can have real and significant implications in the deployment of violence. The ways in which 
policing and state violence and their rationalities overlapped with the rollout of neoliberal economic 
reform in Egypt adds another piece to the puzzle.  
 
6 Ferguson, James, and Akhil Gupta. "Spatializing states: toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality." American 
ethnologist 29, no. 4 (2002): 981-1002. 
7 Varman, Rohit, Per Skålén, and Russell W. Belk. "Conflicts at the bottom of the pyramid: Profitability, poverty alleviation, 
and neoliberal governmentality." Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 31, no. 1 (2012): 19-35. 
8 Ibid., 20.  
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The framework of neoliberal governmentality brings front and center the effects of reform 
policies in their material and political manifestations as a source of instability and a force of change. 
This mode of analysis opens a new question about the nature of reform; How do the policies and 
changes made by reform regimes legitimize or undermine modes of governmentality? The 
macroeconomic outcomes of a set of reform policies tells one story, their bearing on the relationship 
between the governor and the governed tells another. In taking the route of analyzing Egypt’s specific 
neoliberal governmentality I aim to add to the literature using the concrete examples of Egyptian 
reform and its implications on the Arab Spring in Egypt. One line of thought developing in the 
literature centers the role of neoliberal development as a defining feature animating protest against the 
Mubarak regime and governments around the world. In this regard, Koenraad Bogaert describes 
neoliberalism as an “accumulation of activities” in which the market takes over from public 
institutions, creating private assets and wealth accumulation. 9 He then frames the Arab Spring and 
other revolutionary movements as a reaction to the spread of neoliberalism; “The (still ongoing) 
uprisings are not just a revolt against authoritarian regimes but also expressions of a systemic crisis, a 
structural crisis of the social order of neoliberal globalization.”10 To add to this claim, I investigate why 
the spread of neoliberalism and its governmentality in Egypt caused such a crisis.  
This analysis also attempts to address a contradiction in development discourse on the link 
between macroeconomic indicators and economic realities. Questions have continued to rise since 2011 
about similar cases of countries boasting macroeconomic success stories experiencing mass 
mobilization against prevailing economic conditions. As a case in point which could mirror any number 
of articles from 2011, an article reacting to the mass protests in Chile in the fall of 2019 noted “Chile 
 
9 Bogaert, Koenraad. "Contextualizing the Arab revolts: The politics behind three decades of neoliberalism in the Arab 
world." Middle East Critique 22, no. 3 (2013): 213-234. 
10 Ibid., 214 
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was once a pin-up economy, lauded as the model other emerging economies should copy. What went 
wrong?”11 The specific context of Arab authoritarianism and non-democratic patronage politics limits 
the similarities one can draw between countries like Chile and Egypt. However, the lens of neoliberal 
governmentality transcends government type precisely because neoliberalism as an economic system is 
presumed to operate independently of political conditions. The following analysis flips that assumption 
on its head; economic policies and their minutia contain profound political consequences and the 
potential for erosion of legitimacy, even when macroeconomic indicators suggest economic success.  
Some sources address the emerging rationality of neoliberal development in limited contexts. 
Kuppinger describes how in Egypt cities and states tried to “illustrate their global ‘arrival’” and appeal 
to luxury and spectacle to heighten their image or status while marginalizing local populations and 
systems.12This issue materialized in Cairo in the form of malls, luxury developments, gated 
communities, hotels, clubs, and the promise of a bid for the 2010 World Cup. In order to achieve this 
pristine image, cities need to control and segregate spaces and restructure them through “layered 
methods of control and surveillance and regimes of economic and spatial governance.”13 These 
methods of control and governance can destabilize expectations and perceptions of legitimacy. 
Kuppinger also explicitly describes reform as a method of promoting elite interests; “resources, 
economic processes, potential sources of corporate profit, and urban spaces are re-evaluated by 
political and economic elites and redistributed in their own best and corporate interest.”14 Evaluating a 
broad spectrum of policies and their effects along these lines can help conceptualize not only their 
driving rationality but also the significance of their political outcomes.  
 
11 Davies, Richard. "Why is Inequality Booming in Chile? Blame the Chicago Boys." Guardian News & Media Limited, last 
modified Nov 18, 2019. 
12 Kuppinger, Petra, Najib B. Hourani, and Ahmed Kanna. "Crushed? Cairo’s garbage collectors and neoliberal urban 
politics." Journal of Urban Affairs 36, no. sup2 (2014): 621-633. 
13 Ibid., 623.  
14 Ibid, 622.  
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Reforming the Egyptian educational system tied in directly with the vision of Egypt’s overall 
economic development. Egypt signed onto the Education For All pledge which triggered IMF and 
World Bank structural adjustment requirements to “decentralize, standardize, privatize, and equalize” 
education. Along these lines, Nixon writes that educational reforms “have squarely been of a neoliberal 
variety, based on the belief that economic liberalization, and in particular privatization, will bring about 
social progress.” 15 The World Bank pushed for private sector investment and public-private 
partnership in education and the end of job guarantees for university graduates.16 These job guarantees 
previously linked the work force of the public sector to those educated in the Egyptian public education 
system.17 Instead, the late 1990s, World Bank emphasized shifting the government’s focus from 
university level education to primary and secondary, with a focus on technical training.18 The shift to 
focus on primary and secondary education ties to export driven economic reform to create a 
“substantial base of semi-skilled laborers” who attract investment through the service sector and 
qualified local middle management.19 The effort to link education to economic growth also followed a 
greater trend; “the concern over basic education cannot be divorced from the plan under structural 
adjustments to build export economies in developing countries.”20 Policies of reform flowed from a 
greater trend of building export-driven economies as a part of adjustment programs, overriding long-
standing guarantees such as those in Egypt.  
The results of the initial push for reforming the educational had mixed outcomes that showed 
some advancement but comprehensive change. On the surface level, education indicators improved. 
 
15 Dixon, Marion Wood. "Investing in Inequality." Middle East Report 255 (2010): 40-43, 47 
16 Dixon, 41.  
17 It is important to emphasize that the productivity and economic value of these job guarantees are outside the purview of 
this work. Others such as Assaad (2006) argue that this system incentivized families to misappropriate spending and 
overburdened unproductive sectors.  
18 Dixon 41.  
19 Ibid., 43.  
20 Ibid.  
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Net enrollment and literacy rates increased significantly from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. However, 
those increases reflected the quantity of students enrolled rather than the quality of education 
provided.21Teachers also continued to receive low pay and inadequate classroom support. Egypt’s 
education system employs 1.6 million22, and teachers represent the largest portion of employees in the 
public sector. However, they received some of the lowest salaries in the public sector and suffered from 
a low status, leading to “absenteeism, minimal classroom initiative and informalization of classroom 
teaching through private tutoring - all factors that contribute to poor-quality education.”23 The failure to 
elevate teachers as a part of a program emphasizing the early phases of education undermined the grand 
vision of education as an incubator for economic growth. Ironically, the problem of an 
underperforming education system was later used to pass off wider economic concerns; IFIs in the 
2000s dismissed growing unemployment, blaming it on “labor market rigidities” and the educational 
system not preparing people for the private sector.24 Part of the education reform program involved 
protecting education from excessive funding cuts, with an eye on preventing dramatic change. This also 
came at a particularly difficult time to reduce funding; “the rapid growth in population made it difficult 
to meet the demand for additional schools and health facilities and the quality of social services started 
to decline.”25The government promised it would not touch education funding or a promised 2006-2007 
teacher wage hike, but financial instability and the USAID assessment program casted doubt that on 
that promise.26 Conflict emerged between the promise to bring about reform without leaving behind 
 
21 Ibid., 41.  
22 Farag, Iman. “Major Trends of Educational Reform in Egypt”. In The Politics of Education Reform in the Middle East: 
Self and Other in Textbooks and Curricula, 80-96. Berghahn Books, 2012. 81.  
23 Dixon, 41.  
24 Pfeifer, Karen. "Neoliberal transformation and the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt." In Political and Socio-Economic 
Change in the Middle East and North Africa, 21-73. eds. Samira Alayan, Achim Rohde, and Sarhan Dhouib. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016. 26 
25 Harrigan, Jane, and Hamed El-Said. Economic liberalisation, social capital and Islamic welfare provision. Springer, 
2009. 82 
26 Dixon, 42.  
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teachers and schools and the policies put in place to grow the economy and provide jobs through 
education. Teachers also did not receive backing from the institutions representing their interests. As 
teachers faced low wages and poor treatment, the public teacher’s union offered little support as it was 
an arm of the political system.27 With no legal alternative for formally organizing, teachers had little 
input with the NDP to advance their interests in policy.  
Policies of education reform also became a source for private sector profit. As with other major 
reform initiatives pushed by the Mubarak government, the policies put in place used resources and 
powers exclusive to the government for private gain. In similar fashion to industrial business interests, 
for-profit private education benefited from incentives such as cheap land and tax breaks in Cairo and in 
new cities built by the Ministry of Infrastructure. 28These investments offered little for existing public 
school infrastructure while engaging the limited resources of the state to benefit expensive private 
education by underwriting some of the greatest expenses for starting a private school. This 
phenomenon does not separately from the public education cuts and stagnation; “Suppression of public 
spending is part and parcel of policies that are redirecting public wealth into fewer private hands.”29 
Pairing policies that benefit private education with public sector cuts that undermine the public system 
relied upon by a much greater proportion of the population formed an overall theme of the reform 
program. 
The process of reforming the education system also created an incentive for students and 
teachers to seek informal means of acquiring quality education and extra wages, respectively. Private 
tutoring and the privatization of education grew significantly as a part of the education system during 
the period of liberal reform. Both served as reactions to elements of reform that placed a heavy 
emphasis on education a means of obtaining economic prosperity, while scaling back on the investment 
 
27 Ibid., 47.  
28 Dixon, 42.  
29 Ibid.  
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in the public, formal education system. The tutoring market serves as an informal privatized education 
system where the perceived low quality of education leads families to seek extra help for their children, 
and underpaid teachers tutor in order to supplement their income.30 In terms of those who supply 
tutoring, the growth in tutoring exemplifies the informal part of privatization where people find new 
ways to survive with high living costs and stagnant wages.31 Teachers essentially take second jobs out 
of necessity; “Low salaries and inadequate funding for schools have led to a growth in private tutoring 
by teachers employed by the state, creating an informal education market to compensate for the 
shortcomings of the public sector.”32 The emergence of a private market for education, both in the 
formal and informal spheres, exacerbated rather than alleviated existing inequalities in education while 
taking more student and educator time to provide a baseline quality of education. The privatization of 
the educational system in the context of neoliberal reform “raised fears of growing inequality in 
educational provisions, especially given that the quality of public education has continued to decline 
after two decades of perpetual reform.”33The privatized informal education system made up ground for 
the lowered quality of  the gutted formal public education system, but only for those who could pay. 
Furthermore, sending children to hours of tutoring after schools just to keep up drew on the time and 
resources of families.  
The effort to push reform failed to maintain the educational system as a public good for all; 
“The wave of privatization in education that was supposed to ‘fill in the gaps’ of public provision has 
instead served those who can afford a private education.”34The regime also prevented actors rivaling its 
authority from attempting to fill the gap in education. Harrigan and El-Said point out that “As the 
 
30 Ibid., 43.  
31 Ibid., 47.  
32 Ibid., 41.  
33 Ibid., 47.  
34 Ibid., 43.  
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quality of state welfare provision, especially in health and education declined, faith-based groups along 
with other civic groups stepped in to fill the gap. In turn, the Mubarak government has felt threatened 
by this trend and has used legislation to make it increasingly difficult for many of these groups to 
operate whilst trying to bring them under state control.”35 Other actors who tried to provide this key 
service and reduce its cost threatened to displace the regime and could not fit into the landscape of 
reform the regime wanted. In the end, educational reform policies geared towards privatization meant 
that only the upper class with significant amounts of disposable income could afford quality education. 
The decline of the education system conflicted with the established narrative of the government 
insuring opportunity and employment through education. Educational reform “signaled the gradual 
disengagement of the MoE from its own ‘socialist’ past as it partly adopted neo-liberal development 
policy strategies devised by international donors, who see investment in education as a means to 
increase productivity, national income and socio-economic mobility, which would eventually lead to 
socio-economic transformation and ultimately democratisation.”36 Reforming the educational system 
formed a core part of the mission, both of the government and outside forces, to boost Egypt’s 
economy while some further hoped to transform  the country politically at the same time. The 
execution of educational reform did not match the grand result envisioned. As Dixon writes, “By 
marrying human development initiatives to market-led growth, neoliberal reforms have helped create 
huge pools of the formally unemployed and underemployed - a disgruntled mass that represents the 
achievement of neither human security nor state security.”37 Not only did the model of improving the 
economy and education through a neoliberal lens fail to improve education and the economy, but 
further exacerbated conditions of social and economic inequality that drove the frustrations of the 2011 
uprising. Those emerging from the dilapidated education system were at the center of these 
 
35 Harrigan and El-Said, 79 
36 Farag, 82.  
37 Dixon, 47.  
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frustrations; “Rapid economic growth matched by growing inequalities, worsening poverty levels and 
rising youth unemployment among educated, and deepening political repression matched by grassroots 
mobilisation, lie at the heart of the destabilisation of Mubarak’s regime.”38The lowered quality of 
public education through the period of reform pushed teachers and students into a private tutoring 
market which took more time, money, and effort from the middle class and the poor. Meanwhile, the 
rich shifted to private schools built with government incentives, money, and land. Under Mubarak, 
public education eroded as a means of guaranteeing employment and opportunity. Instead, the public 
educational system demanded extreme sacrifices from family, students, and teachers for little to no 
return and yielded an underemployed generation unable to advance. Educational reform along the lines 
of neoliberal ideology also took a burden off of the Mubarak regime. Using the rhetoric of shrinking 
government, the reform program in concrete terms removed the government’s responsibility to 
properly fund public schools and removed the expectation that government would employ graduates. 
These changes followed a logic that individuals, rather than the state, bore the responsibility for 
achieving success. Drastically shifting expectations for a wide swath of the population about what 
getting an education would provide them in terms of skills and employment bred frustration and a sense 
of betrayal. 
 
Labor Relations 
One of the most important relationships strained by the government’s pursuit of economic reform was 
between workers and the state. Early on under Gamal Abdul Nasr’s presidency, a tentative deal was 
struck in which “trade union leaders agreed to support Nasir’s regime and give up the right to strike in 
 
38 Paciello, Maria Cristina. "Egypt: Changes and challenges of political transition." MEDPRO Technical Paper 4 (2011). 6.  
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exchange for guaranteeing worker’s economic demands, most importantly job security.”39 This bargain 
set the stage for the conflict that neoliberal reform would open between workers and the Sadat and 
Mubarak regimes. Adopting neoliberal policies disrupted the economic security provided by the state 
because the state was expected to retreat from providing employment and therefore economic security. 
Joya expands on this contrast; “Workers who had experienced extensive benefits from the Nasserist 
period were witnessing a withering away of those benefits under neoliberal reforms. Under Nasser, 
workers’ benefits ranged from extensive labour rights such as high wages, public pensions, sick leave, 
child bonuses, fixed rents and price controls of basic commodities.”40 These benefits formed the basis 
of the expectations workers held against the state, especially those employed by the state. Public sector 
employees held a further, slight privilege over others; “even though the salaries of public sector 
employees were modest, they nonetheless were higher than those of most of the working class.”41 In a 
country and economy where a living wage and stable employment were hard to come by, public sector 
employees valued their jobs and benefits deeply. 
These expectations, along with the relationship between labor and the state, changed drastically 
with the adoption of neoliberal reform. During this period of slower privatization and liberalization of 
the 1990s the government changed labor laws to provide greater control over unions, preventing 
radicals from moving up the ranks while rewarding loyalists who adhered to the system. These law 
changes prevented fixed-contract employees from running in union elections, prevented public workers 
from running who were most vulnerable and likely to oppose government privatization.42 As a result, 
 
39 Bishara, Dina. Contesting Authoritarianism: Labor Challenges to the State in Egypt. Vol. 52. Cambridge University 
Press, 2018. 27.  
40 Joya, Angela. "The Egyptian revolution: crisis of neoliberalism and the potential for democratic politics." Review of 
African political economy 38, no. 129 (2011): 367-386. 373.  
41 Paczynska, Agnieszka.“ Economic Liberalization and Union Struggles in Cairo” in Cairo Contested: governance, urban 
space, and global modernity. ed. Diane Singerman 331-348. Oxford University Press, 2009. 342 
42 Bishara, 31 
 
 
17 
 
union power went down with liberalization and the regime kept the union in line by co-opting the 
leadership. However, that leadership became ineffective because the union could no longer play its 
fundamental role of protecting job security and wages and the rank-and-file lost its faith in the official 
union to provide them with representation.43 Union leaders won political and material benefits, but the 
rank-and-file lost their economic stability and their limited access to representation. The continual 
pushback mounted by workers throughout reform represents a principal-agent problem; the regime 
wanted to control the union in order to make it more pliable to the reforms it aimed to pursue. 
However, co-opting the leadership made that leadership ineffective; the union brass no longer 
represented the interests of the workers and became a stooge of the regime.  
Workers in the public sector faced some of the greatest sacrifices as the state looked to 
restructure its role in the economy. The effort to privatize major public companies offered lucrative 
opportunities for the political and economic elite, but spelled disaster for the economic security of those 
employed by the state. Public sector jobs offered key benefits including health care, retirement 
pensions, and consumer good subsidies. These benefits were unrivaled in the private sector, which also 
could not fill the existing employment gap between the public and private sectors.44 In order to ease the 
transition of state-held companies from the public sector to the private sector, the government offered 
workers early retirement to shed costs from public sector enterprises before selling them.45 For reasons 
mentioned above, workers did not favor this option. To avoid triggering backlash the government tried 
to create incentives and retirement packages that encouraged public sector workers to leave their jobs 
voluntarily instead of laying off workers en masse. Contentious negotiations on the particular 
conditions of these retirement packages went back and forth throughout the 1990s.46 The slow pace of 
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these reforms and the governments tentative attitude toward making sweeping, fast changes reflect the 
efficacy of the social contract between labor and the government. This tentative pace of negotiations 
came from the government’s desire not to upset the workers too much, while also pushing forward the 
privatization program. However, this tentative pace failed to generate quiescence from workers and 
protests against reform continued.47 Protest and discontent continued because “the changes in the 
global economy and the market reforms that the Egyptian government initiated during the 1990s had a 
deleterious effect on workers’ job security and standard of living.”48 Regardless of how slow the 
reforms came or the exact terms by which public sector workers would retire or transition to the private 
sector, the insistence on dismantling the public sector itself inherently threatened the few privileges 
workers coveted.  
The government-labor conflict was renewed by further attempts to reduce the rights of workers. 
In 2003, the government passed the Unified Labor Law giving more firing and hiring discretion to 
employers but still did not give labor “the right to organize, to strike, and to elect its own independent 
leaders.”49 Another showdown ensued, as workers and ETUC representatives pushed back against 
business interests with limited success. Workers won the limited right to strike, but only through formal 
channels like the ETUC50 , which offered little substantive representation as discussed previously. 
Thereafter, protests and notable wildcat strikes increased dramatically throughout the rest of the 
decade; in 2007 alone over 500 protest actions and strikes occurred. These actions included various 
parts of the public sector including real estate tax collectors, workers at the Misr Spinning and Weaving 
Company, microbus drivers, and the Telephones Equipment Company. Their demands and grievances 
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included increasing wages, receiving unpaid wages, and the insecurity of temporary contracts in place 
since privatization.51 The fight for worker’s rights moved outside the confines of institutions co-opted 
by the regime.  
Regime-labor relations occupies an important place in the development of reform regimes, and 
their successes and failures. Per Bishara; “Authoritarian regimes may resort to the support of popular 
classes during the early phases of state formation, but that they may try to shift their support to other 
constituencies, such as business, when they attempt to carry our neoliberal economic policies.”52 
Reform did not just entail changing economic policies, it involved realigning the informal social 
contracts which limited regime activity. Gutner emphasizes this point further; “Political leaders may 
also alienate important interest groups and supporters when undertaking structural adjustment and other 
economic reform policies, which can thwart the success of reforms.”53 Breaking the agreements upon 
which the legitimacy of the regime rests can throw a reform program into question; in Egypt, the result 
was a widespread popular uprising. 
Part of the perception of reform comes from who the reform program appears to serve and 
benefit. In the neoliberal conception of reform, labor tends to get the short end of the stick. Hinnebusch 
wrote of the 1991 Egyptian ERSAP; “Although all Egyptians accept some reform measures, many, 
including economists, see the IMF/World Bank package as untailored to Egypt's needs and expressing 
the drive of international capital for a friendly global environment in which the requirements of 
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investors and creditors come before those of labour, debtors or nations.”54 By adopting an adjustment 
package that benefitted investors over labor, the regime signaled its abandonment of labor as a 
stakeholder in the economic path that the country would take. As Hinnebusch emphasizes, Egyptians 
were not opposed to reform a priori, but putting the burden of reform on workers and hollowing out 
their historical privileges and forms of economic security marginalized workers in the process of 
reform. Looking forward, this marginalization of workers as a stakeholder in decision-making came 
back in full force; “The growth of new labour and farmer syndicates before the revolution and 
throughout 2011 gave Egyptians who had been thrown out of the processes of development an arena in 
which to voice demands for a new Egypt.”55 The voices and demands of workers were only briefly 
silenced. Once new forms of organization and expression emerged with the breakdown of the regime, 
labor interests reasserted their demands as formalized groups. 
Urban Land Seizure 
 
Land seizure formed a battlefield between the interests and expectations of the mass poor and the desire 
of the government and political elite to reclaim land for commercial purposes and personal benefit. On 
the urban side, land seizure and counter reform take a different form than the rural context discussed 
below. Instead of pushing a program of land consolidation for export-driven, large-scale farming, the 
government pursued urban land seizure in Cairo and elsewhere through a program of slum eradication. 
The government used various justifications to clear areas deemed undesirable, through commercial 
justifications, environmental justifications, among others. These actions, among them violent and 
 
54 Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "The politics of economic reform in Egypt." Third World  Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1993): 159-171. 
162 
55 Bush, Ray. “Marginality or abjection? The political economy of poverty production in Egypt” in Marginality and 
Exclusion in Egypt. Eds. Ray Bush and Habib Ayeb. 55-71 Zeds Books, 2012. 67.  
 
21 
 
destructive conflicts, placed the reality of residents of informal housing at odds with a government that 
wanted to upgrade the image of Cairo without consideration for the needs of residents.  
A majority of the twenty million residents of Cairo live in ashwa’iyat,56 dense informal housing 
which receive neither formal inspection nor services. The ashwa’iyat are spread throughout Cairo, 
largely on the Northern and Western periphery and emerged in the early 20th century. Informal areas 
also occupy the periphery in terms of the state’s attention; “The living standards in general tends to be 
much lower in informal areas due to lack of facilities, e.g. water networks, sewerage systems, public 
and social services.”57 Inhabitants of these informal settlements in many ways build and grow the city 
where planning does not occur. These areas also blur the line between the city and the countryside; 
“Ashwaiyyat is generally established in areas of essentially rural character located on the urban fringe 
that are interspersed with, surrounded by, or adjacent to undeveloped sites or sites that remain in 
agricultural use, and spread in advance of the principal lines of urban growth.”58 While informal, the 
construction of ashwa’iyat carries out a natural process in the city, filling in the gaps to provide 
housing for those who cannot afford other options. These settlements emerged in a context where the 
government role in planning and housing construction petered out alongside formal private 
contrsuction, especially for the poor. As Soliman describes, “ill-conceived and inadequate policies have 
led over time to a mismatch between supply and demand and to severely curtailed private sector 
investment in housing production for the urban poor,” leading to the situation where ashwa’iyat make 
up 88 percent of new housing in Egypt.59  
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Cairo from the Salah a-Din citadel, October 2018. Image by author. 
The ashwa’iyat received the ire of reform minded officials. Slums and informal housing 
suffered from a perception as a roadblock to state and private housing development which ignores “the 
larger infrastructure and services gaps that are prevalent in the informal city.”60 Informal settlement not 
only received a reputation as an eyesore but as unnatural to the city; “the ashwa’iyyat in 
Cairo are commonly viewed by the state and non- settlement residents as a problem; in their view, 
these settlements produce social ills and violate the modern, cosmopolitan image they hold for 
Cairo.”61 In addition, informal settlement has been “pathologized in state-sanctioned public discourses 
as unplanned, unserviced, and illegal.”62 Informal housing in urban areas and small landowner and 
tenant farmers in rural areas shared a similar perception as antithetical to potential economic progress. 
Support for these groups, therefore, waned in the face of a liberalization program that failed to 
 
60 Bell, Jennifer. "Land disputes, the informal city, and environmental discourse in Cairo." In Cairo contested: Governance, 
urban space, and global modernity ed. Diane Singerman. 349-371. Oxford University Press, 2011. 351 
61 O'Donnell, Shawn. "Informal Housing in Cairo: Are Ashwa'iyyat Really the Problem?." (2010). 
https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/92714/1/Informal%20Housing%20in%20Cairo.pdf. 3 
62 Dorman, W.J. “Of Demolitions and Donors: The Problematics of State Intervention in Informal Cairo.” In Cairo 
contested: Governance, urban space, and global modernity ed. Diane Singerman. 269-290. Oxford University Press, 
2009. 272.  
 
23 
 
articulate robust plans to serve the basic needs of and provide basic opportunities to these marginalized 
groups. These perceptions manifested in how resources and the attention of the state were divvied out; 
“Authorities designated inhabitants of areas that experience outbreaks of disease as uneducated or 
backwards, blaming them for their conditions rather than the lack of services, while wealthier areas 
enjoyed greater infrastructural advantages and attention.”63 Areas already seen as unpleasant suffered 
further as authorities put their effort into providing greater services for the already well-off.  
The discourse around the destruction and resettlement of informal dwellers changed over time 
along with the onset of reform. Informal settlement clearing occurred under Sadat and Nasr with the 
addition of the resettlement of the displaced under Nasr. The major distinction with Mubarak was the 
addition of environmental language as a guiding reason. The government “began to mobilize 
environmental discourse to buttress its land use policy” to justify the destruction of informal housing 
for road construction and tourism development.64As discussed below, tourism in particular offered 
opportunities for the state to mobilize resources to benefit its constituents in business. Informal 
residents and communities on the periphery of tourist areas or who occupied land valuable for tourism 
came into the sights of state for removal and rehabilitation. The state’s environmental agenda in 
informal housing areas “serves to distract from the equity issues involved in policies that favor the 
tourist or private real estate sector over the urban poor and from the costs associated with the 
destruction of housing when it is in such short supply.”65 A type of opportunism for development 
further undergirded attempts to remove informal settlements. When environmental crises came, such as 
with the smog incident of 1999, authorities quickly blamed informal residents and artisans who stood in 
the way of tourism development in Old Cairo.66One of the targets of informal settlement demolish was 
 
63 Bell, 353.  
64 Ibid., 354.  
65 Ibid., 353.  
66 Ibid., 357.  
 
24 
 
a community of artisan potters in the Old Cairo area. Potters had appealed for funds to broaden the use 
of gas fired kilns to improve the fumes they generated. Instead, the government demolished their 
workshops wholesale, drawing questions of whether authorities were truly concerned with pollution or 
just the potters’ “informal way of being.”67 Destroying the pottery settlement prompted protest and 
riots, followed by an altercation with police that lead to deaths.68 The stigma propagated by the state 
against informal housing materialized in the form of violence and dispossession.  
Despite healthy speculation and harsh rhetoric concerning informal settlements, major 
confrontational demolitions remained relatively uncommon. The Egyptian government has instead not 
fulfilled its intentions to demolish informal settlements, and has fallen back to promises of “upgrading 
and legalizing.”69 One reason explaining this inconsistency says that popular action, organized or 
unorganized, effectively resisted efforts to eliminate informal settlement, providing “bottom-up 
pressure” that prevented the state from taking drastic action against informal housing. Fearing 
resistance and violence in response due to Cairo’s urban constitution and history, the government 
prefers to “neglect the informal rather than coerce it.”70 Residents who organized and protested against 
the destruction of their places of living demonstrated the power small segments of urban communities 
can have when the government had little means to justify razing the homes of their citizens. This 
resilience also demonstrates the weakness of the state at heart; “the survival of the Cairo informal 
housing sector can be understood in terms of a perennially impoverished state lacking the resources to 
intervene effectively in its capital.”71 That a few small communities could successfully force the state 
to back down showed the government its limits. Informal settlements and their communities defied 
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attempts to force them to acquiesce to this system of developing the city. As Asef Bayat writes, the 
poor “negotiated with the neoliberal order, creating their own informal communities of life and labor 
through protracted struggles in everyday life”72 Informality in Cairo proved resistant to the half-hearted 
reform attempts at integrating informal communities into the “neoliberal order.” Similar to the way that 
informal housing conflicted with regime reform rhetoric, the following section details another informal 
community’s struggle with the government’s attempts to impose through reform and standardization a 
particular order onto informal modes of living and working.  
 
Waste Collection – The Case of the Zabaleen  
 
Waste collection restructuring posed a major challenge that the government aimed to address in 
urban areas. In Cairo, privatization of the waste collection system formed a part of the overall goal of 
private sector driven growth and the offloading of public services. Furthermore, the standardization of 
services such as waste disposal into a more systematic, organized structure formed a key piece in 
upgrading the image and stature of Cairo as a world metropolis. In the case of trash collection, the push 
for privatizing trash collection came into conflict with the embedded trash disposal system which 
serviced Cairo. The Zabaleen trash system in Cairo was linked to the religious, cultural, and economic 
peculiarities of Cairo’s evolution into a sprawling, dense city. Moreover, the communities and networks 
formed by the trash collection system became a symbol of dynamic indigenous innovation that served 
Cairo according to its needs and on the terms of its residents. The government sidestepped the local 
system of trash collection and imposed a transition to liberalization by contracting foreign firms. In 
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doing so, the government overrode the urban social fabric and functioning local structures in order to 
establish Cairo as a modern metropolis along neoliberal lines and rationalities. 
Prior to privatization and standardization, two communities in Cairo were responsible for waste 
collection and processing, the Wahiya and the Zabaleen (Zabaleen collectively). The Wahiya were 
collectors and held the contracts with residents and served as middlemen.73 In addition, the Wahiya 
“kept the city (especially the wealthier quarters) relatively clean, and instituted networks of 
recycling.”74 Meanwhile, Christian Zabaleen who migrated from Upper Egypt at the turn of the 20th 
century provided services as disposers of organic waste using pigs which the Muslim Wahiya could not 
raise, and sold the pigs to tourist facilities. Middlemen set up settlements and work premises for 
Zabaleen who “devised organic solutions to problems, as they tailored work regimes, methods, and 
techniques to local circumstances.”75 Health, safety, and economic security were tenuous for the 
Zabaleen, and various local organizations worked to improve living conditions and build institutions 
for the community. As such; “despite remaining hardships and poverty, the quarter ‘prospered.’”76 In 
1970, the city relocated the Zabaleen to the Moqattem plateau. There, the Zabaleen established a 
community that employed thousands, disposing of waste through recycling or through their pigs, 
surrounded by complementary economic activity to their disposal system such as craftspeople. The 
community enjoyed no services and no school or health center until the 1980s.77 
Changes to the livelihood of the Zabaleen began with attempts to push their settlements and 
workshops farther out of the city. The attempts to clear out the Zabaleen from their settlements and 
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workshops tied into the desire to rehabilitate Cairo’s external image. This drive ignored the critical role 
of the Zabaleen; “The objectives of the rehabilitation programme tended to favour tourism-orientated 
projects, while ignoring the local population’s interests, through the proposed removal of informal 
Zabaleen settlements.”78 As a nascent operation occupying land valuable in terms of real estate and 
tourism development, the Zabaleen represented a fundamental contradiction to the government’s vision 
of the future of Cairo. As a solution to the contestation of settlement clearing, the government instead 
moved the Zabaleen outside the city. The Cairo governorate relocated Zabaleen settlements 25 
kilometers to the east, similar to the relocation of people from other areas designated for 
“rehabilitation” such as pottery artisans in medieval Cairo.79 By pushing the Zabaleen out into the 
desert the government physically marginalized a group already living on the periphery. 
Driving part of the struggle of families and collectors in the face of relocation was their 
informal status on the land they occupied. The trash collecting and processing communities faced 
similar problems to rural tenants and landless peasants who lacked documentation and legal protection 
for where they lived. When the government began insisting on relocation from areas in which the 
Zabaleen had worked and lived for decades, they lost security and faced eviction.80 Compounding the 
inherent informality of the Zabaleen, the plans for relocation or compensation were unclear and 
unpopular and the Zabaleen feared for their physical security and ability to carry out their work. 
Zabaleen expressed frustration about the lack of inclusion and consultation of their community in the 
waste restructuring project. Community representatives proposed poverty alleviation projects and 
emphasized the potential consequences of resettlement and restructuring for social and communal 
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ties.81 The concern for their livelihoods took center stage but the conflict over restructuring trash 
collection was further characterized by the contested role of the Zabaleen in society. 
The Zabaleen saw themselves as serving an important role for the city and valued their work 
and their place in the city. Moving and having to change how they went about their work threatened 
their way of life, physical security, and economic livelihood.82The push to remove the Zabaleen 
advanced a “hidden agenda” to benefit housing and land developments to capitalize on the value of the 
land by relocating the Zabaleen to the desert, thereby freeing their previous settlements for 
development into luxury housing or tourism.83The spatial presence of the Zabaleen hampered the vision 
of development in terms of the stigma regarding the uncleanliness of waste disposal as a restriction to 
the growth of business, but also due to their direct presence on valuable land. These dynamics made the 
Zabaleen a target of liberal reform.  
In contrast to the self-perception of the Zabaleen, the government’s narrative portrayed the trash 
collecting communities as an impediment to reform, progress, and modernity. Similar to the rhetoric 
around fellahin small farmers, the Zabaleen’s old methods that grounded economic and social ties were 
seen as holding back Cairo from its full potential; “Officials at the [Cairo Cleaning and Beautification 
Authority] regarded the Zabaleen’s indigenous methods of waste collection as unhygienic.”84 As trash 
and pollution problems increased into the 21st century authorities pushed for “more comprehensive 
solutions” that brought in multinational corporations to handle waste, ignoring the Zabaleen as 
stakeholders in process.85 Implementing privatization involved creating a system of contracts between 
the city and contractors. This process received criticism given that it ignored the indigenous and 
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already existing Zabaleen system. The cost and effort alone in creating a new system from the ground 
up raised questions. As one Community and Institutional Development member pointed out, “these 
contracts are costing the city big money. Why not spend just 10 percent of such a budget to upgrade the 
Zabaleen system.?”86 While most could recognize that the Zabaleen system needed upgrading, an 
overhaul and replacement of the system made little sense. Proposals suggested using organic waste to 
make ethanol, further threatening and marginalizing the role of the Zabaleen in waste collection and the 
use of that waste for recycling and other production.87 Rather than incorporating the benefits of the 
Zabaleen’s informal methods into a partnership with privatized services, the model advanced by the 
government focused on private companies training Zabaleen as wage workers, creating “dependency 
rather than partnership.”88 Incorporating the Zabaleen as laborers within the corporatized system run by 
foreign firms eliminated the Zabaleen’s agency as a stakeholder. Organizations representing the 
Zabaleen failed to protect the Zabaleen from the process of privatization or mitigate those problems 
through mediation with the government or through a campaign against privatization. Instead, “it would 
appear that their business interests now prevail over the NGOs’ earlier role of promoting the Zabaleen 
community.”89 As a marginalized group operating in an informal landscape, the Zabaleen had few 
resources and supporters to challenge the path taken by the government.  
After taking responsibility for waste collection and disposal, private contractors failed to 
provide the same widespread, and consistent service as the Zabaleen. The new system proved unable to 
meet the needs of Cairenes while costing more and marginalizing the Zabaleen. The Zabaleen 
meanwhile proved resilient and useful by separately contracting with individuals and the contracted 
corporations to fill in the service gaps left, but overall the waste situation deteriorated.90 
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Rules imposed on the Zabaleen, such as the elimination of donkey carts for waste transportation, 
creating a “stratification” among the Zabaleen between those who could afford to upgrade their 
equipment and those who could not, therefore determining who could continue operating in affluent 
areas where bans were enforced.91 In addition, private contractors were unable to find enough workers 
and so had to contract the Zabaleen who still remained in service. The city also failed to pay 
contractors, leading to strikes and absences in service, which further deteriorated the quality of trash 
collection.92  Privatization eroded the ability of the Zabaleen to provide robust services, while the 
quality of the services provided by the contracted firms dropped. The Zabaleen eventually returned to 
servicing around one third of Cairo’s waste, but the damage was done and contracted companies 
continued to profit off of the official role they enjoyed.93 The privatization process disrupted 
expectations and quality of life standards held by urban dwellers about waste disposal. 
The importance of privatization in all aspects of economic activity in Cairo trumped organic, 
existing systems built on the local labor and social ingenuity that provided an imperfect but stable 
system. The government did not investigate how an upgrade to or investment in the Zabaleen system 
could achieve the stated goals of modernization, cleanliness, and health. Rather, privatization of waste 
introduced a new paradigm from scratch that provided worse services and threatened the jobs and 
livelihood of the Zabaleen by putting foreign firms in charge of waste collection and disposal. The 
transfer of trash collection services amounted to a transfer of resources. The conflict between the 
government and the Zabaleen “not only diminished the livelihood of the Zabaleen but ultimately aimed 
to eliminate much of this livelihood and transfer its revenue to global corporations.”94 The community 
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and collection economy developed by the Zabaleen became a target because the activity it undertook 
could be coopted.  
A particularly stark incident highlights the growing tension between the trash collecting community 
and the government. In 2009, the government culled and slaughtered between 190,000 and 300,000 in 
response to the swine flu, many owned and used by Zabaleen to process organic waste and as a source 
of food and income.95Killing the pigs caused the Zabaleen to stop picking up organic waste, leading to 
a buildup of rotting food on the city streets, creating an actual cholera health crisis whereas the swine 
flu had been disproved as a threat to the population. Moreover, malnutrition spiked in children due to 
losing the pigs as a source of food. The justification of the slaughter shifted over time, from a necessity 
driven by a swine flu health crisis to a general need to clean up the neighborhoods and settlements of 
the Zabaleen.96The shifting narrative of the state was further tainted by what was done to make up for 
the loss of the pigs; “Some zabaleen received compensation for their pigs, but how long does a limited 
amount of money last? The zabaleen’s response was straightforward: with no pigs to feed, they stopped 
collecting organic waste.”97 In this incident, the government’s repeated attempts to marginalize the 
Zabaleen showed their true consequences. The pig slaughter demonstrated the inefficacy of the contract 
system with foreign companies, as a garbage crisis emerged once the Zabaleen could not or would not 
pick up trash without their pigs.98 The corporatized system failed to address the needs of the city on its 
own and left Cairenes and the Zabaleen without proper services and work, respectively. The 
significance of this incident should not be underestimated; the pig slaughter “was one of numerous 
instances of government oppression and violence that indirectly and unintentionally fed into the 
Egyptian uprising of 2011.”99 Growing discontent with the state can grow when trash piles up and the 
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streets get dirty. Trash collection and waste disposal rarely makes the headlines in terms of 
revolutionary grievances. The state of the Zabaleen and waste disposal in Cairo demonstrates that 
disturbances to marginalized professions and groups have profound effects.  
The efforts to restructure urban trash collection exposed a deep flaw not only in the specific 
plans of the Egyptian government to change the urban environment but also a blind spot in the 
neoliberal model for development. In marginalizing indigenous trash collection, the government tried 
to privatize an already private system that had developed deep roots in the urban fabric of Cairo. 
Kuppinger further puts the Egyptian case in a wider context; “Globally modeled high-tech solutions, 
urban patterns that privilege rapid circulation, and consumption-oriented projects took precedence over 
local forms, potentials, and livelihoods.”100 These projects also orient themselves towards benefitting 
corporations.  The new contract system reduced Zabaleen to collectors, undesirable for the Zabaleen as 
well as residents, while profitable for the contracted companies.101 Furthermore, physically removing 
the Zabaleen from their workplaces was oriented towards the development of the land on which they 
lived and worked. The construction of al-Azhar Park, the Cairo Financial Center, and real estate 
speculation on the Moqattam plateau brought pressure from authorities and developers for the 
Moqattam Zabaleen settlement to move.102 Empowering the private sector and transferring land from 
underneath the Zabaleen signaled clearly the rationale the government embodied; promote 
development as modeled by neoliberalism and leave local systems behind as a vestige of the past. The 
weakening of the Zabaleen system fits in a greater trend, wherein governments endeavor to assimilate 
into a global model instead of embracing local ingenuity.  
The case of trash collection begs a further question about the reason for undertaking 
privatization. Unlike other sectors where public sector firms dominated the market through party 
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cronyism, Cairo’s Zabaleen system already operated largely outside the purview of the state. An 
infrastructure for collecting trash already existed, so why did the government bother to create a new 
one from scratch? The drive to bring in foreign firms and supplant the Zabbaleen system served as 
another means of mobilizing state power to bring investment and build ties between an emergent 
private sector and the government. In the context of trash collection, the government’s rationality 
demonstrated that it prioritized siphoning public funds to foreign firms rather than supporting a 
functioning, indigenous service system.  
 
Health Care 
 
Along with education, health care service formed a core tenet of government provision of 
services along with education and consumer good subsidies. Health care spending lags behind world 
rates at 3.7% of GDP and more than half of that spending occurs in private healthcare rather than in the 
public sector. Furthermore, the public health care system does not cover those working in the informal 
sector, creating greater instability for the economically vulnerable.103 In addition, the system is in some 
ways regressive; “The poor pay relatively more (both out-of-pocket and through the tax system) and 
receive relatively less in benefits than the better-off social strata.”104 In this way, the system failed the 
people it was intended to help. The public health care system also goes underutilized; “only 25% of 
households who are covered by public health insurance are benefiting from it due to low quality 
services and excessive red tape.”105 Other logistical flaws compound the ineffectiveness of the system; 
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“Insured individuals reported several reasons for not using HIO facilities: distance was cited by 18% of 
the individuals, 35 percent cited the long waiting time, and 44 percent cited lower-quality services”106 
Even those who are eligible to access free health care through the government could not navigate the 
system or did not trust the quality of the care they would receive. Gericke summarizes; “The Egyptian 
health system has been characterised as having virtually all the problems encountered in former 
socialist countries, while at the same time possessing few of the advantages and most of the problems 
of an open-ended, US type system.”107 Egypt’s health system had the worst of both worlds, an overly 
complicated public bureaucracy lowering the access to and quality of care compounded by a 
freewheeling private system which enjoyed a better reputation.  
The aforementioned problems pushed forward efforts to increase the effectiveness of the public 
health sector. In tandem with economic reform, “the Egyptian government began developing healthcare 
reform policies with the premise of providing and financing a basic level of health care services for its 
population.”108 However, similar to the problems faced in public education during reform, the quality 
of health care continued to suffer from a disparity of quality between the private and public sectors. A 
tendency emerged where public sector doctors took second jobs in the private sector, giving them an 
incentive to siphon patients to their own private practice.109In a further parallel to the tutoring problem 
mentioned above, families going to the private sector for healthcare paid out of pocket at their own 
risk; “To obtain adequate healthcare, many households in Egypt rely on out-of-pocket financing which 
increases the risk of becoming impoverished if the out-of-pocket payments were substantial and for 
prolonged periods”110 Unlike education, where out of pocket expenses could at least theoretically 
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increase the opportunities of the student, health care expenses treated illnesses but did not provide a 
longer term benefit. Along these lines, Haley and Beg warn that ‘‘Policies must also be established that 
prevent the shift of limited resources from the public healthcare system to fund a private system that 
often caters to a wealthier population.”111 Privatization of health care and the decline of the public 
system were linked by crossed incentives by doctors and a lack of funding to keep the value of public 
sector treatment competitive. In fact, the health care provided by Islamic and Coptic private voluntary 
organizations(PVOs) had a greater reputation than government hospitals due to a perception of greater 
care for the sick regardless of station and in the actual quality of care.112 The provision of treatment 
based on economic class and financial ability eroded the trust in the public sector healthcare system to 
treat people in an equitable way. Already a source of inequality, the erosion of quality in health care and 
the inability of reform to solve these issues compounded the uneven development in the decades 
leading up to the Arab Spring.  
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Rural Experience Under Neoliberal Reform 
 
In rural Egypt agriculture reigns supreme. The banks of the Nile have famously produced 
plentiful bounty for millennia, but the strains of a booming population and stagnant land usage placed 
tremendous strains on the Egyptian agricultural sector to boost productivity and the amount of land 
cultivated. Entering the Mubarak era under which agricultural development became a key feature of 
World Bank, IMF, and USAID reform policy and support in Egypt, Egyptian farmers faced 
monumental challenges and weak incentives to shift their production. As seen above in the urban 
context, reform pitted various segments of the population against the government and its vision of what 
structural adjustment would look like for Egypt and Egyptians. In the rural context, different policies 
and priorities brought new conflicts unique to the countryside yet fundamentally related to the 
problems of the city. Land seizure, state support and services, employment, and investment all played a 
part in the government’s reform program in rural areas, conflicting with previous expectations held by 
small farmers and tenured residents. During the reform era guarantees protecting crop prices, ensuring 
subsidized inputs, and laws which provided land security to peasants all came under fire. Furthermore, 
in advancing neoliberal reform in the countryside, the Egyptian government prioritized large-scale, 
export-driven agricultural production at the behest of major IFIs and to the detriment of small farmers 
and peasant workers. As in the urban context, the collapse of basic services and guarantees from the 
government redefined the relationship between the governors and the governed and contributed to the 
frustrations which drove the Arab Spring in 2011.  
  
Tenure Reform  
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For rural Egypt ownership and control of land, specifically arable land, determines economic 
opportunity and security.  Egypt experienced two major shifts in land distribution in the post-monarchy 
period. The first re-distribution occurred under Nasr in a bid to dislodge the landed elite and extend 
influence in rural areas previously held by the aristocracy. In the decade following the Free Officers’ 
Revolt in 1952, Nasr’s government enacted land reform policies that “redistributed one seventh of the 
cultivable land, mostly from large landowners to the fellahin, and capped land ownership at 200 
feddans by 1961” while also providing guarantees of security to small landowners and tenant 
farmers.113 This combination of robust, direct state support in production and support for land claims 
presented serious challenges for the entering Mubarak regime which faced a broad economic crisis and 
specifically an agricultural one. These existing traits of the Egyptian agricultural sector and the literal 
rural landscape encapsulated an entrenched rural political economy that made reform not only a 
difficult process in theoretical economic terms, but also in political practice. The fellahin class had 
become accustomed to a post-revolution “social contract” in which government supported  
their livelihood and protected their land, costing the people “political repression and limited political 
participation.”114 Nasr’s land reform policies aimed to reduce the holdings of large landowners and 
provide robust rights for small landowners through laws of inheritance and tenant farmers through 
rights to secure tenure. While a large swathe of land was redistributed and the largest landholdings 
broken up, the elite managed to maintain much of their land and the desired shift in power to a broader 
segment of the population failed to take hold.115 Nevertheless, this distribution of land created a system 
of support for the agricultural fellahin class and spoke volumes about the legacy of Gamal Abd al-Nasr 
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and the state of Egyptian political and economic philosophy up to the 1990s and the shift to aggressive 
liberal reform. 
The second redistribution occurred in the context of liberal reform under reform as it kicked 
into gear in the 1990s following the adoption of the 1991 ESRAP and growing pressure from the World 
Bank. Centered around the Law 96 of 1992, this tenure reform effort implemented liberalized land and 
tenure laws, significantly altering the land distribution in rural Egypt. The law reduced limits and 
moratoria on rent increases by landlords and eliminated protections for renters and land inheritors 
guaranteeing them security. The law allowed for rents to increase gradually but significantly; “the 
maximum rent was raised from seven to twenty-two times the land tax for a five-year period, after 
which rents and tenancies were to be uncontrolled and all tenants could be freely evicted.”116 As a 
result, at least 800,000 lost their rights to their land, rents increased significantly, and many could not 
afford or were rejected for new leases or land purchases.117 The effects of the law further rolled back 
the clock on the goals of the initial land reform of the 1960s ;“The new law deregulating land rent and 
the ‘ return ’ to determining rents ‘ by the laws of the market alone ’ may well have the effect of not 
only fully liberalizing the agricultural sector, but also, whether intended or not, of encouraging a trend 
toward reconcentration, due to small tenants abandoning their plots since they cannot afford the new 
rent.”118 Landowners with newly unprotected tenets were able to push poor tenets off the land and 
reclaim it. The law further revoked credit assistance from small land holders and dismantled co-
operative agricultural organizations which small farmers had relied on previously for inputs like 
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fertilizer. Eliminating these supports and instituting a market based system for inputs and land 
amounted to wholesale rejection of Nasser’s policies.119 As a result of this counter-reform, “peasants 
with secure tenure rights were transformed into landless sharecroppers or migrant labourers.”120 
Peasants went from a protected class enjoying state guarantees and physical security to largely landless 
and devoid of state support.  
The issues of land tenure also spilled over into fishing communities. In the Four Sister’s lakes 
along the Mediterranean, communal management of the lakes’ fishing resources from the past was 
eliminated by the repeal of land reform and land privatization.121 In this context, the winners of 
privatization were large-scale farm fishing corporations. These companies occupied a similar position 
to large agricultural companies in that their ability to increase productivity and volume of fish promised 
to bring food security to Egypt. In pursuit of this goal, these companies increase the use of chemical 
inputs and vastly increased production, putting pressure on a fragile ecosystem previously worked by 
small local families with limited chemical inputs.122 These large-scale operations frequently encroached 
on local operations, but their informal claim to their fishing areas gave them little recourse. 
Furthermore, enforcement of any claim required contacts in the police and NDP in order to actualize 
your claims to an area.123 Small fishing communities on the coast faced similar challenges to small 
landowners or tenet farmers. Neither fit the vision for how the government imagined Egypt would 
advance economically, and so the government chose to disregard their interests and ways of life.  
Implementing the new tenancy law required the use of force as many protested evictions and 
rent increases. Bush “Peasants also challenged owners in the courts, mobilised against the police and 
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were often found not guilty of criminal offenses only to have rulings overturned by military 
governors.”124 Violence also accompanied these court rulings; “In Egypt there were more than 119 
deaths and 846 injuries between January 1988 and December 2000 that were linked to rural conflict, 
and the drafting and implementation of Law 96 of 1992”125 As a fundamental restructuring of the  
The state does not disappear as private owners or enterprises establish ownership of land, property, or 
resources. Rather, the state “is often absolutely instrument in establishing the rule of private property - 
particularly if resistance is encountered - and enforcing the rules of the market.”126 Not only did the 
regime create laws that dispossessed land from the rural poor, but the courts, local police, and the 
military upheld these dispossessions through violence. Organized protest formed around the law 
changes and counter-reform but the full weight of the state intervened to enforce the new land 
distribution. Privatization of land and the removal of tenancy protections was not a passive act, it 
required responding to the people’s objections with force in order to turn the new law into reality.  
Driving the effort to remove small farmers and tenets from small agricultural lands was a 
perception that their way of life prevented economic progress. This reversed the previous perception of 
small landowning farmers and tenet farmers from the anti-aristocracy sentiments of the age of Nasr. In 
the new era of reform, peasants were depicted as “the real culprits of the Egyptian agricultural crisis 
and therefore of the country’s economic difficulties as a whole” and this argument was used to “better 
justify the liberalization of the economic sector and the call for investors and big landowners to ‘save’ 
the agricultural sector in Egypt.”127 Peasants went from the lifeblood to the burden of Egypt’s 
agricultural aspirations. Peasants shifted from being the producers of Egypt’s food to liabilities: 
economic burdens whose lack of productivity and fierce protection of their land limited the potential of 
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Egyptian agriculture to modernize the economy.128 Instead, peasants became simple wage workers in 
the greater scheme of large agribusiness; the shift away from small land ownership relied on peasants 
working on the large farms.129 In the process of tenure counter-reform, peasants lost their role as the 
standard bearers of Egyptian agricultural production. Their security and dignity were stripped, yet their 
labor remained necessary.  
The aggressive nature of the tenure reform pursued in the 1990s also represented a new drive 
among business interests in the NDP empowered by a liberalizing economic environment; “The 
rollback of the agrarian tenancy law was the work of the bourgeoisie in parliament which pushed a 
radical version favorable to landlords and utterly devoid of protection for tenants which even the 
government initially wanted.”130 The regime and the NDP spent the 1980s cautiously, carefully pushing 
mild reforms and quickly backing off whenever policies faced too much resistance as in the cases of 
price liberalization and subsidy cuts. Tenancy reform stands as one of the first shifts towards more 
aggressive reform pursued by the Nazif government in 2004 and beyond. The fact that the government 
weathered the storm of tenancy reform without an existential challenge to its legitimacy signaled that it 
could continue with a program of reform that dispossessed and impoverished vulnerable peasants, 
small landholders, and tenet farmers without large-scale opposition. The outcome of this dispossessions 
contrasts the urban scenarios discussed above; rural opposition and protest did not carry the same 
weight as urban protest which had the potential to mobilize great numbers. The stories of resistance and 
violence in the face of tenancy reform show that opposition existed, but that such opposition was 
overwhelmed by the capacity and willingness of the regime and its clients to mobilize the repressive 
apparatus as well as the legal system to crack down harshly in order to entrench the new land 
distribution in pursuit of agricultural exports. 
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Underlying this land tenancy counter-reformation was an assumption that placing land and crop 
production in the hands of large landholders and export-oriented corporations would boost exports and 
help feed the country. However, tenancy and agricultural reform provided little concrete evidence of 
economic growth or reduced poverty but clearly benefitted landowners who capitalized on support for 
seizing land and business people who used the land for large agricultural ventures.131 Furthermore, 
these reforms exacerbated inequality between reinstated large landowners and small landowners as well 
as the newly landless. Re-concentration of land ownership through “dispossession of smallholder 
farmers, under the guise of market reform-induced land transfers, has accelerated resource and income 
inequality.”132 In pursuit of large-scale farming as a means of boosting Egyptian agricultural exports, 
the Mubarak regime reversed the Nasr-era rhetoric of anti-aristocratic social justice through the 
redistribution of land back to the wealthy. The results consisted of dispossessed and massacred poor 
farmers, empowered large landowners, and questionable economic gains at the end of the day.  
 
Agricultural Policy Reform  
 
The dominant discussion around agriculture viewed the sector as a force for nationalist pride; 
Egypt, with abundant natural resources and the greatest river in the world, should feed itself. However, 
the goals of self-sufficiency and food security faced significant problems posed by trends of 
consumption and production heading towards a spiral of increasing imports, stagnant productivity, and 
noncompetitive exports. Nasr-era policies of agricultural support as well as fears of revolt during the 
Sadat era kept in place supports such that consumers enjoyed low, almost free prices on basic 
foodstuffs, especially bread and other wheat products, while farmers enjoyed controlled prices for their 
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crops and agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and seeds that kept costs low. The agricultural policy 
reforms undertaken by the Mubarak regime in consultation with IFIs aimed to end those supports and 
offset the need for imports with high-value exports.  
As early as 1989, before the ERSAP was finalized, Galal Amin identified that “the distorted 
economic structure can be traced to the abandonment by the state of its role as an active investor in 
agriculture and industry and as a regulator of private investment.”133 One of the key changes in 
reforming the agricultural sector was price liberalization. The government reduced controls on staple 
crop prices, notably price floors. This change resulted in a reorientation between farmers and 
distributors; “with the withdrawal of the state from procurement, farmers must negotiate their prices 
with competing (and sometimes unpredictable) merchants.”134 In fact, the creation of a market price 
system substituted one form of structural power over the agricultural sector with another. In one case, a 
study in Qina and Aswan found that “only larger landholders were likely to have the financial and 
logistical capabilities to access and benefit from the private sector.”135Transitioning from flawed public 
price controls to a private market system only offered relief to those with the capacity to take advantage 
in filling the vacuum left by the government. In reality, the switch to market system did not alleviate 
the problems small farmers faced; local brokers and landowners controlled who could use land and 
how they would sell crops, establishing new market monopolies where state dominance and regulation 
used to be.136 With the government exiting its role as a price controller, powerful middlemen took over 
to determine prices in its place, favoring those with bargaining power over those with smaller amount 
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of land and crops to influence the price they can receive from these middlemen. Creating free markets 
opened up many avenues of manipulation while also failing to protect Egyptian producers; “Markets 
did not work, because of monopolization, hoarding, and speculation, and the exposure of farmers to 
international price swings that make free-market farming impossible all over the world.”137 In 
eliminating supports for farmers, Egypt did not even provide protection for its industries that 
established market economies did. For example, the United States and Europe both protected their 
sugar producing industries to the detriment of less developed producers.138 Egypt’s approach to 
entering the free market did not compensate for the complexities of the international market and how 
they would affect domestic producers.  
Major figures, such as Agricultural Minister Yusuf Wali, identified a needed change in Egypt’s 
agricultural production. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Egyptian leaders and ministers had 
attempted to make Egypt self-sufficent in producing its most important staple crop, wheat. However, 
due to consumption Egypt was the third largest importers of grain in the world by the mid-1980s. In 
order to end that reliance Egyptian farmers would have to use every single feddan for wheat 
production. Instead, Wali wanted to cover cereal imports with other agricultural exports in an effort to 
exploit comparative advantage, specifically through fruit and vegetable exports.139 USAID also pushed 
for the agriculture industry to grow high value, low nutrition crops for Europe to boost exports and 
capitalize on comparative advantage.140 The results of this strategy were mixed; some producers 
increased output as well as productivity per feddan. On the other hand, this strategy resulted in a 
decline in earnings for rural producers because of higher input costs and oligopolistic traders. 
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Furthermore, production was reaching its technological limit and labour ceiling. IFIs and USAID 
wanted to expand past those limits by moving to large commercial farmers which hurts the rural poor, 
and still did not address the problems with the crops’ competitiveness in the export market.141 
Agricultural reform aimed to remove the government from production of inputs and outputs and 
remove regulation and price control. This would facilitate the creation of large agro-business that 
would export high value products. However, Egypt lacked the “infrastructure and the knowledge 
necessary to compete effectively in a very competitive international market,” rendering futile the 
attempts to use the free market to boost the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the political landscape 
incentivized real estate speculation and development or construction over agribusiness for investment. 
142The path of agricultural reform policy failed to accomplish the goal of global export competitiveness 
while also undercutting vital sources of economic security for the vulnerable in the Egyptian 
countryside.  
 
Health Care and Education: Dwindling Resources 
 
Health care and education form a nexus representative of inequalities and disparities between 
rural and urban areas generated by liberal reform in Egypt. As elsewhere, public education and health 
programs declined with reform, lowering the quality of education and emptying clinics and 
hospitals.143However, rural health care systems also suffer disproportionately. Rural areas have many 
fewer inpatient facilities, recieve disproportionately fewer physician hours, and suffer from severe 
shortages or simply the absence of specialists. General practicioners, while more numerous in rural 
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areas, are underqualified or inexperienced.144 Furthermore, Ibrahim145 documented from 2006 to 2008 
“the ground-level experience of local inhabitants with inadequate education (e.g., illiteracy of up to 30 
percent and a falling school enrollment ratio), failing healthcare provision, growing unemployment and 
poverty, and disillusionment with an incompetent and disengaged state bureaucracy, corruption, and 
electoral fraud.”146 Alongside civic and political frustrations, the decline in key services like education 
and health care lowered the quality of life in rural areas. Health care in rural areas also suffered from 
contradictory incentives and perceptions. In rural clinics, “The rule is that patients could be examined 
at the village health unit for a nominal fee of fifty piasters (half an Egyptian pound) between 9 a.m. and 
12 noon. After midday, the physician is free to examine the patients privately for a fee of LE3– 4. 
Despite the higher cost, most people prefer the private examinations, since they feel that the physician 
gives them more attention and a thorough examination.”147 Getting transportation to these clinics also 
imposed greater challenges in the rural context. Long travel times added to the cost of care such that 
“the cumulative effect of the cost and inconvenience of transport, medical care, medication, and the 
fact that other problems have a greater priority than health, is to dissuade many people from seeking 
treatment.”148 The obstacles faced by rural residents in obtaining health care made it likely that 
treatment for all but the most dire illnesses was prohibitively expensive.  
Another source of declining education prospects in rural areas came from Law 96, the tenure 
counter-reform law. Forced to pay higher rent and with precarious living situations, peasent families 
took their kids out of school as parents could no longer afford transportation and school fees. 
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Furthermore, the promise of employment after education was faltering as well.149Rural students faced 
much greater challenges turning their primary and secondary education into success in higher 
education. The chances for rural students, both male and female, to succeed in finishing higher 
education is significantly lower than their wealthier counterparts in urban areas.150 Assaad argues that 
in fact the structure of Egypt’s public education system so privileges the rich over the poor, the urban 
over the rural, that the free education system requires overhaul in order to narrow the gap the two 
gruops.151 Yet, the value of education never doubted despite low quality and little chance of 
employment. Reflecting on fieldwork in rural Egypt, Abu Lughod writes “It is surprising to me, for 
example, that the faith in education is so widespread given that there is so little decent employment for 
the educated, and that the overtaxed educational system is so poor (with underpaid teachers forced to 
make ends meet by offering private lessons in the afternoons and evenings to students who learn 
nothing in overcrowded classrooms). Yet, no one questions the value of education.”152 The perception 
of education as a vehicle of opportunity never faded despite narrowing avenues for advancement.  
 During the era of reform, the gap between rural and urban healthcare and education further 
grew. The modest gains in poverty rates and health indicators in the 1990s also failed to reach rural 
areas, particularly Upper Egypt.153 The gap grew to the point that “ in 2008– 9, on the eve of the 
popular uprising in January 2011, the rural poverty rate is just under three times urban poverty rate and 
far exceeds the average poverty level in Egypt.”154 These disparities are highlighted by stark statistics; 
“In Egypt in 2008, a pregnant rural woman was about half as likely as an urban woman to receive 
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prenatal care or to have an assisted delivery, and she was more than three times as likely to give birth at 
home.”155 This inequality also drew resentment. As Abu-Lughod writes of villagers’ perceptions of 
visiting urban tourists; “it stung villagers to know that these others were richer than they were more 
powerful, and looked down on them; the locals were convinced that their own schools, the goods 
available to them in their markets, their opportunities for jobs and futures, and even their medical care 
were all inferior to the goods, services, and prospects enjoyed by these urban visitors.”156 The growing 
divide between resources and services in urban and rural areas raises the question of whether macro 
indicators of health and wealth fully capture lived experience. Years of reform brought Egyptians 
farther apart, not closer together.  
 
Land Reclamation 
 
Part of the challenge of developing Egypt’s economy stems from the rapidly growing population on 
a constant or shrinking amount of arable, habitable land. Throughout Egypt’s modern history, 
successive governments attempted land reclamation projects to increase arable land and relieve 
pressure on overcrowding cities. Characterized by grand visions and chronic underachievement, 
reclamation projects consumed significant resources and promised revolutionary change, but delivered 
little. Desert land reclamation projects pursued by the Mubarak regime represented a seriously flawed 
aspect of its reform program while continuing to promote the interest of large investors and agricultural 
interests.  
The Toshka reclamation project was a staple reclamation project of the Mubarak regime. The 
project had further implications for the rest of the Egyptian agricultural sector downstream in the Nile 
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Delta;  “Toshka has also diverted water from Lake Nasser that would otherwise flow to irrigate crops in 
the Delta and it became an additional mechanism to reward political (and economic) allies close to the 
Mubarak regime.”157Mega-projects such as Toshka promised to revitalize the countryside by opening 
new agricultural lands and relieve pressure on urban populations through migration away from 
overcrowded cities. The process of creating new towns, opening new lands, and building dams served 
to extend the reach of government farther in the desert. Reclamation taking the form of government 
expansion also allowed the government to determine the beneficiaries of reclamation. Concentrated 
capital in the form of investors and large companies came out on top in this competition; “in the newly 
reclaimed land, farms are larger, more technologically advanced, and owned by private corporate 
businesses such as exporters and processors. These large private farms have the resources to use 
certified seeds, proper crop rotation, and drip and sprinkler irrigation systems, which reduce the 
occurrence of disease and increase yields.”158 Reclaiming lands benefitted the already well-off, those 
who had the capital, whereabouts, and connections to further capitalize on their advantages.  
As such, “agrarian reform since the mid-1980s rewarded political coalitions of large landowners and 
investors able to benefit from state subsidies in the new desert reclaimed lands and mega new 
agricultural projects.”159 From tenure reform to reclamation policies, large landowners made up the 
state’s constituent beneficiaries. Bush further connects efforts at desert land reclamation to the overall 
agricultural development and reform strategy; “The IFIs and the government are now trying to 
maximise the production of high-value low nutritious foodstuffs for export markets. In doing this they 
focus on developing new land, reclaiming deserts and investing in capital- intensive machinery that 
only large landowners and investors can afford.”160 Establishing new lands on which to pursue large 
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scale farming to grow agricultural exports opened new opportunities for land distribution to the well-
connected without the violence and friction of displacing small farmers as with the Nile Delta. 
While offering lucrative investment opportunities, large reclamation projects did not meet their 
stated goals despite large expenditure. For example, the Toshka project did not meet its goals; it 
generated a maximum of thirty thousand jobs, did not spur mass migration from the city to the country 
side, and still managed to reduce liquidity and benefit “crony investors.”161 The government did 
establish a program to grant unemployed graduates and landless peasants small plots in the “New 
Lands”, but the actual number of people settled paled in comparison to the growing population – 
69,000 claimed beneficiaries over a period of twenty years.162 Land reclamation promoted a grand 
vision, but few results. Mitchell and Sims write that the goal of resettlement was largely for show and 
to  “appear to give hope to the many tenant farmers who had been tossed off their old land and farms in 
the liberalization reforms of the mid-1990s.”163 In the end, “there is little basis upon which to assume 
that any of Egypt’s big schemes will provide a panacea for agricultural growth. There is far more 
evidence that the schemes will promote environmental crisis, suck in available liquidity and provide 
opportunities for asset stripping by foreign and some Egyptian interests.”164 Land reclamation projects 
received the full force of the state’s bureaucratic and financial toolkit to chase dreams in the desert.  
Regardless of the political conditions that spawned the gold rush for reclaimed land, the nature 
of large, new, remote projects promoted the interests of those groups that could afford to participate in 
such an endeavor. Land reclamation, billed as the expansion of Egypt’s agricultural prowess, 
marginalized Egypt’s rural population which did not benefit from the same kind of intensive 
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investment. Instead, the reform regime passed over tougher issues of growing productivity and 
improving infrastructure to pursue vanity projects at high cost and with little return.  
 
Tourism 
Part of the vision of economic reform in Egypt involved maximizing the resources Egypt 
already has. Famously, Egypt possesses ancient sites of religious, cultural, and historical significance, 
including the Pyramids of Giza, Christian and Muslims sites, and the natural beauty of the Nile. 
Furthermore, Egypt’s Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts offer significant potential for vacationing. Part 
of the reform process, then, included a push to exploit these resources to boost to the private sector 
through tourism. This process involved privatizing land, awarding contracts, and attempting to attract 
investment for building necessary infrastructure at the sites in question and the necessary transportation 
infrastructure. While expanding the tourism industry brought in tax revenue, further investment in the 
tourism industry played out in a way that maintained rents for patronage through special laws and tax 
exemptions. This process allowed the regime to maintain a system of patronage while also preserving 
services in the short term.  
Richter and Steiner165 describe the threat to the rentier state in Egypt in the 1980s with the fall 
of oil prices and a general economic downturn which cut Suez revenues and foreign remittances. They 
then put forward the claim that tourism filled this gap in the 1990s and 2000s, as the economic and 
political elite searched for a new source of patronage. This discussion of the adaptation of neo-
patrimonialism through the tourism industry intersects with the political economy of economic reform. 
Tourism fit squarely with a reform program that employed the language of privatization, attracting 
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foreign investment and visitors, and most of all required little deviation from the existing system of 
patronage.  
The adaptation of the tourism industry to provide patronage through the language and policy of 
liberalization carries implications for authoritarian patronage regimes embarking on economic liberal 
reform. The Egyptian case challenges neoliberal policy prescriptions in developing, rentier states 
because the neopatrimonialism state adapts to maintain itself. In this case, the liberal prescriptions of 
privatization and the offloading of the state’s assets amounted to a transfer of wealth from the state to 
the political elite at the expense of the Egyptian treasury. A healthy liberalization process would have 
dismantled the neopatrimonial state but the tourism sector contributed to keeping patronage alive. 
Instead, the 1980s decline in rents connected directly to the tourism increase; offsetting one loss in 
rentierism with a gain in the other. 
The great symbols of Egyptian history and centers of tourism also served as the lifeblood of this 
new rentierism. Egyptian tourism has an absolute rent and monopolistic advantage at places like the 
Pyramids, archaeological sites, and Coptic Cairo among others.166 The government controlled access, 
licensing, and renovation resources for these areas. As such, “It is difficult to separate patriotic concern 
for the preservation of Egypt’s heritage from desires to increase tourism and the income it generates for 
the state and private investors.”167. The exploitation of tourism sites came into direct conflict with the 
former’s physical surroundings. As exemplified by the story of a family near Luxor;“In 1982, the 
World Bank drew up plans to convert their field into a parking area for tour buses. Fortunately, when 
the government implemented the plans it spared the field, although several other households lost land 
to tourist industry expansion.”168 The needs of the tourism industry became imposed on the vulnerable 
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to the benefit of tourism companies. On the other side of the equation, the process of land reclamation 
fed into the utilization of land for the benefit of tourism. Starting in the 1980s, independent investors 
could reclaim land ostensibly for agricultural use and gain the title to the land after 3 years. However, 
“In other cases, as came to be reported prominently in the subsequent decade, many large farms were 
converted to upscale villa developments or roadside commercial strips.”169 Reclamation, land reform, 
and the expansion of opportunities for tourism investment all merged together. While the poor were 
kicked off their land for large agriculture projects or the construction of parking lots, investors gained 
new land and new opportunity.  
Rentier states can weather fiscal crises either through “external renter diversification” or 
“internal development policies.”170Throughout reform, Egypt pursued a middle ground with tourism. 
Tourism diversified rents, but only internally. Growth in tourism was largely fueled by domestic 
investment, but not the kind that grew the more important parts of the economy, instead elites used the 
high profitability and exploitability of the tourism industry to maintain personal benefit. In addition, 
expanding tourism further acted as a solution to the economic crises Egypt faced by bringing in foreign 
currency. From 1970-2005, “tourism became the most important source of foreign exchange income 
for the Egyptian economy.”171 Tourism provided a lifeboat for an economy deeply in trouble, but not a 
long-term solution to underlying weaknesses. Government bodies also helped grease the wheels for the 
tourism industry to expand. The establishment of the TDA (Tourism Development Agency) - helped 
the “tourism industry to take advantage of the changing legal and economic environment” as the TDA 
facilitated the planning and implementation of coastal and remote land distribution. The TDA 
facilitated the passing of laws which codified import benefits and international investment incentives in 
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the 1990s.172 Expanding and investing in tourism in Egypt provided opportunities for differential rents; 
state policy in Egypt significantly affects the viability of tourism.173 Thus, opportunities abound to 
generate rent from capturing the benefits of changing policy in tourism through shrewd positioning.  
Part of the tourism expansion strategy was to open remote areas controlled by the government 
that had potential for development. The recent peace treaty with Israel opened large swathes of desert 
coastline in areas previously restricted by the Egyptian military for security purposes, including in the 
Sinai and along the Red Sea.174 In these areas, few communities existed to benefit from new 
development. Instead, resorts and tourist destinations opened new, isolated zones for economic 
profitability for the military which facilitated the transfer of land to private investors along with the 
TDA. In reference to the Sinai, Mitchell and Sims write “this 190- kilometer shoreline was a coastal 
resort paradise waiting to happen. All that was needed were better roads, some utilities, a commercial 
airport, and a government policy friendly to private investors.”175 Existing communities in both rural 
and urban areas were circumvented by development in isolated areas which instead generated rents for 
the intermediaries and investors. 
The push to turn over undeveloped coastal land to the private sector took on the distinct 
character of a cronyist operation. The state sold coastal land to investors at below market rates, 
generating rents and also potentially creating personal advantage for the deal-makers and their 
reputations in the bureaucracy.176 This process closely relates to the methods used to sell off public 
companies to “private” individuals; those with the connections and wealth got the land for cheap, and 
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those helping out benefit. Various laws boosted the tourism industry, including tax exemptions for 
investment in tourism, designation of land for tourist use, public sales of land to private investors from 
the state, and investment in tourism infrastructure by the government.177 Meanwhile, banks provided 
massive lines of credit and liquidity for this cheap land. This process could turn a relatively small 
investment into tremendous amount of capital with which to build a hotel. Combined with the tax 
incentives and government provided infrastructure, a connected investor could turn a massive profit in 
this environment.  
Amidst all these factors which bring into question motivations of the push to grow tourism as a 
part of liberalization, the tourism industry in fact experienced a massive boom. No industry 
experienced the growth of tourism; for example, textiles grew 223% from 1991-2005, but tourism went 
up 592% in the same time period.178 Further, tourism increased its overall role in the economy, 
reaching eight to ten percent of GDP and thirteen percent of total tax revenues.179 This rise in tourism 
almost managed to offset the failure to upgrade traditional economic sectors180 allowing the pace of 
reform to lag while holding off another crisis. Tourism not only provided new opportunities for 
patronage, but also maintained the tax revenues of the government; “without tourism revenues, the state 
could not have financed its budget deficit through domestic borrowing for so many years; instead, large 
cuts in the vast public expenditures would have been likely, eventually followed by increasing social 
instability.”181This revelation further explains why a booming tourism industry did not make a dent in 
terms of improving the actual health of the Egyptian economy. In fact, the Arab Spring happened 
despite a growing tourism industry. The grievances of high unemployment, deteriorating services, and 
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blatant corruption were not addressed by growth in tourism. Tourism aided in maintaining rents for 
patronage and tax revenues, propping up existing economic arrangements without substantive reform. 
The tourism industry amounted to a rent-based, shock-prone industry that created reliance rather than 
overall economic growth and security.  
Richter and Steiner sum up the incentive to pursue economic reform through tourism succinctly; 
“The advantage of tourism development was that it did not require substantial structural reforms and 
was therefore less costly than reforming, de monopolising and expanding other economic sectors.”182 
Tourism provided a quick fix to the foreign exchange and revenue crises the country faced while also 
offering a life line to the domestic economic elite during a period when the public sector was ostensibly 
shrinking. Moreover, the tax breaks, cheap land, lines of credit, and public infrastructure expansion all 
served as expenditures in favor of tourism over supporting other productive sectors.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The rural experience tells a crucial part of the larger story of attempts to liberalize the Egyptian 
economy while the existing system of patronage authoritarianism shifted its framework from 
bureaucratic stateism to crony capitalism. Small landowners and tenured workers saw their rights and 
their social bargain dissolve before their eyes as powerful players ranging from rich former 
monarchical aristocrats to big businessmen expanded or retook land holdings, squeezing out small land 
owners and summarily removing tenant farmers. Vulnerable peasants witnessed crop prices fall and 
input prices rise, while external support aimed at raising Egyptian exports flowed to large, well-
connected or foreign owned operations as opposed to smaller, local farmers. The judicial and repressive 
 
182 Ibid., 956 
 
57 
 
apparatus affirmed these changes as police and thugs lashed out violently at anyone who challenged or 
objected to court rulings that appeared to turn back the clock to times of unabashed inequality that 
inspired previous uprisings throughout centuries of Egyptian history. For peasant farmers and small 
landowners in rural Egypt in the era of reform, the countryside became a battlefield for survival as 
unemployment rose, established norms and expectations collapsed, and the wealthy and powerful 
further established their privileged status. Whereas previously small farmers made up the backbone of 
regime stability through stable expectations of support and dignity in their livelihood and their land, the 
average peasant was cast aside by a regime that pursued policies of liberal development which 
empowered connected investors and large farming operations.  
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The Role of the Egyptian Military 
 
No analysis of Egyptian political economy is complete without a discussion of the outsized role 
of the military in the Egyptian economy and the sway it holds in the Egyptian political economy. 
Further research is merited on the degree to which military influence in public economic affairs bears 
responsibility for the failure of Egyptian reform to bring about economic gains. As discussed above, the 
conflicting interests between government, the connected business community, and international actors 
pushing reform lead to a stop and start reform process that both failed to enact some vital reforms while 
going too far in other areas. Embedded throughout this process was the military, exerting its power and 
filling in the gaps to profit off government inaction and to capitalize on limited forms of privatization.  
The Egyptian military “captures a disproportionate share of public revenues and resources that 
would otherwise have gone to competing state institutions and private companies, and diverts 
considerable amounts of investment capital from other productive sectors of the economy.”183 Parallel 
to a bloated and corrupt civilian public sector, the military’s economic empire enjoyed benefits as an 
organization which fundamentally clashed with any attempt at decentralization and the transition to a 
free market economy. The number of economic endeavors that fall under the umbrella of the military’s 
control are staggering. Sayegh maps these various organizations,184 showing that the military’s assets 
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include companies that produce helicopters, planes, vehicles, and armaments, but also fertilizers, 
chemicals, wood, and bottled water. The military also owns tourist hotel chains, supermarket chains, 
steel and cement giants. With all this productive potential sequestered in the military’s area of the 
economy, the economy as a whole lost out as it went through the difficult transition from socialist 
statism to the “free” market.  
The process by which the military made use of liberal reform further had a personalist 
character; “The economic reforms that began in the 1990s facilitated the transformation of the power 
wielded by the senior officers into wealth. Businessmen in Egypt had the resources to buy what the 
generals-turned bureaucrats had the authority to sell, namely, public lands and companies, and the 
collaboration between the top brass and wealthy entrepreneurs proved profitable to both sides.”185 
Military leaders formed a parallel group of beneficiaries of reform through the power and influence 
they wielded and their institutionalized control of the state’s resources. The officer’s connections with 
each other and their control of a bureaucracy shielded from the public eye allowed them to undermine 
the liberalization process to their own benefit. The military’s wealth and power also fed into the overall 
effect of reform wherein privatization “benefited only men with connections to Egyptian politicians 
and the military establishment.”186 While the military often prides itself on providing for Egypt and for 
driving Egyptian industrialism, the military’s contribution to the corruption and opportunism which 
defined Egyptian structural reform tells the opposite story.  
 
It is no overstatement to presume that with a military that did not control land, private wealth, 
and significant competitive advantages, private sector growth and liberal reform in Egypt would have 
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expanded in a healthier way. On the other hand, those gains captured by the military may have simply 
fallen into the hands of the economic elite in Gamal Mubarak’s circle and the NDP’s patronage system. 
Regardless, the complex relationship between the Egyptian population and the military obscured mass 
inefficiencies and the outsized role of the military in the economy as a part of the military’s role as the 
protector of the nation, whereas elite cronyism enjoyed fewer excuses in the public eye.  
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In Egypt, implementing liberal economic reforms under the prevailing political system handed 
powerful tools to seasoned veterans of exploitation among the economic, political, and military elite to 
evolve and thrive to the detriment of the economic progress of the country and the Egyptian people as a 
whole. When push comes to shove, Egyptians went to the streets because they perceived neoliberal 
economic reform as unjust. Growing inequality, falling subsidies, stagnating wages, higher input costs, 
higher housing and education costs, and failed infrastructure projects communicated to the public that 
the rewards of reform would not come to them quickly. The timeliness of these uprisings also 
intersected with the worry of many that Gamal Mubarak’s rise to prominence in the regime during the 
2000s predicted decades of more of the same.187 Moreover, the system of political and economic 
patronage seemed to reward the rich and powerful with a steady stream of benefits that buoyed them to 
comfort and insulated them from the harsh parts of reform suffered by the masses. Bush and Ayeb 
makes this case as well; “The struggles between the broadly defined groups of those who benefited 
from growth - the political elite, crony capitalists and the military on one hand and workers and 
peasants on the other - shaped the revolutionary forces that toppled Mubarak.”188 The costs of 
constantly and consistently marginalizing the poor and vulnerable in the economic policies and 
political decision-making came to bear on the regime.  
In reflecting on the initiation of liberal reform and its vast consequences, it is crucial to ask why 
Egypt went down this path towards neoliberal reform in the first place. Part of the answer may be in the 
specific context of 1991 and the Gulf War; Egypt received debt relief for supporting the US-led 
coalition, saving the government from a crisis while also pressuring the government into the ERSAP. 
On the other hand, it is impossible to ignore the overall fiscal and import crisis starting in the 1970s and 
continuing through the crash of oil revenues and remittances in the 1980s. After all, Sadat’s Infitah laid 
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the groundwork for attempts at full liberalization more than a decade before the Gulf War and began in 
a different geopolitical moment. I posit that all those factors reflected an underlying need for economic 
change, and it just happened that neoliberal reform through IFI-style structural adjustment was the 
solution of the day. Most importantly though, neoliberal reform conveniently fit with the Mubarak 
regime's survival - it did not have to make political reforms to please its creditors. The regime could 
initiate privatization, cut subsidies, increase private property rights, and ultimately reduce what the 
regime was responsible for while bolstering their "networks of privilege"; the authoritarian crony 
capitalist dream. Why neoliberalism? Because it was the model the powerful West advocated for and 
put faith in, and it worked with Mubarak's cronyism.  
It is also important to note that this outcome is not inevitable. Neoliberal governmentality shifts 
from context to context, as the political structure and government type govern who directs reform and 
structural adjustment and the beneficiaries therein. In Egypt, adopting structural adjustment under 
cronyist state-ism yielded crony capitalism. In Costa Rica, for example, stronger and more independent 
representation and popular pressure led to a significantly different outcome following neoliberal 
development; “even after a quarter century of neoliberalism, widespread citizen support for key public-
sector institutions has permitted the survival of a reinvented welfare state and, moreover, has made a 
willingness to adapt, preserve and extend the model an essential ingredient of popular legitimacy for 
any government.”189 There, decades of neoliberal reform yielded a political reality which necessitated 
that any government protect similar rights and guarantees that were wiped away in Egypt.However, the 
recognition that neoliberal structural adjustment does not always throw the popular masses under the 
bus does get neoliberal institutions off the hook for their failures in Egypt and elsewhere; the relative 
success story of Costa Rica stems from popular pressure and grassroots organizations, not external 
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agencies or creditors. While they still wield the power they do to influence the livelihoods of billions 
around the world, neoliberal institutions must restrict themselves from working with countries who 
they know will abuse privatization and will take advantage of markets. The policy is only one piece of 
the picture, the politics make or break the policy.  
   
Tahrir Square, Cairo, October 2018. Image by Author. 
The bravery and sacrifice of Egyptians who went to the streets in 2011 cannot fade from the 
public consciousness. Those people, in that triumphant moment, stood up to a political system that had 
ceased to represent them and had sold out the public at large in favor of a select elite. The following 
decade of turmoil does not provide much optimism that the political change which seemed inevitable in 
the frenzy of the Arab Spring will materialize. However, the protests across the world in the past year 
have called out growing inequality and again reinvigorated the will for popular mobilization expressing 
economic and political frustrations. The world is awake and full of those advocating for something 
else, a global, inclusive political and economic order that dispossess no one, ignores no one, and lifts 
up the vulnerable. As the Hebrew phrase goes, ken yehi ratzon, let it be so.  
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